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Abstract: Many reasons for the low level of local development in Sicily have been advanced 
through the years, often connected to historical and geographical explanations. More frequently 
the reasons of the backwardness (better low rate of development) is connected to high level of 
crime and of mafia phenomenon, or to structural grounds (first of all, Sicily is an island) and intra 
regional markets’ dimensions. Little space, instead, has been devoted to institutions and law and 
to the effectiveness of legislative self-government. In ours paper we will slight the constitutional 
profile trying, instead, to answer, with the typical approach of the economic analysis if is it 
possible that some reasons of the backwardness of Sicilian economic development are hidden just 
in this constitutional diversity of Sicily. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Apart from some extreme views, the economic doctrine accepts that – even though with 
some limits and under determined conditions – the State assumes an active role in the 
economy when market is inefficient and when the invisible hand does not succeed in 
generating an efficient resource allocation. In these cases, therefore, the visible hand of 
institutions and laws can support economic and social development. 
Too much often, however, unwise lawmakers and managerial inefficiencies of public 
actors have added to the risks of  market failures. 
The question we want to address is whether in the case of Sicily both forms of 
inefficiencies operate simultaneously. 
Is it possible that institutions endanger markets more than they succeed in promoting 
their actual working? 
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Many reasons for the low level of local development in Sicily have been advanced 
through the years, often connected to historical and geographical explanations. 
More frequently the reasons of the backwardness (better low rate of development) is 
connected to high level of crime and of mafia phenomenon1, or to structural grounds 
(first of all, Sicily is an island) and intra regional markets’ dimensions.2 
 
Little space, instead, has been devoted to institutions and law and to the effectiveness of 
legislative self-government. 
Economic analysis has adopted an individualistic approach to institutions: institutions 
and law are seen as constituting the background context in which economic action takes 
place. 
As a matter of fact, institutions play an active role in the economic arena, at times 
competing with individual agents (people interact with government institution in order 
to improve their well being), and represent a constraint to every economic decision and, 
at the same time, an economic agent. 
 
The political choice that turns into legal norm, at the apex of the institutional order, 
becomes a Constitution. 
The constitution of a region is its statute; Sicily is a special statute region; its statute 
has been adopted with national constitutional law. 
The specialty of the Sicilian statute has been the result of a political choice, very old in 
time, expected to guarantee more autonomy in economics, social reform and 
administrative organization. 
Because of some local identities, particularly marked, the Italian Constituent decided to 
grant to five Regions a regimen of particular autonomy.3 
Very meaningful was the case of Sicily: such it was the political urgency, to recognize 
its special character that its special statute was adopted before the same Constitution!4  
 
Today’s the system of the autonomies is still changing, above all as outcome of the 
constitutional reform of 2001, adopted with constitutional law. 
In ours paper we will slight the constitutional profile trying, instead, to answer, with the 
typical approach of the economic analysis if is it possible that some reasons of the 
backwardness of Sicilian economic development are hidden just in this constitutional 
diversity of Sicily. 
 
It has been argued in the economic literature that, between constitutional norms and 
economy, there is a missing link.5 
                                                 
1 Among other Centorrino, M. (2004) ‘Mafia, Economia e Globalizzazione’ in Il sogno 252, 7 
2
 Cfr Home market effect licterature and Krugman P ‘Scale economies, product differentiation and the 
pattern of trade’. In the American Economic Rewiew 70/V 1980 
3 Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicilia, Sardegna, Valle d’Aosta e Trentino Alto Adige, Approved by 
constitutional law 1, 2, 3, 4 e 5. 
4 Regio decreto legislativo n. 455 del 1946 
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If we find it and bring it to light, we should be able to unveil some important relations 
between rules and development. A parliament unaware of this missing link may have 
built an autonomous system that, rather than promoting historical and social diversities, 
slows down competitiveness of the relevant area, impairing its growth. 
In particular, in the special statute are hidden some reasons of the retarded economic 
development in Sicily: there are some national laws that have been delayed, because of 
the sicilian legislative self-government.6 
 
Its special statute, in fact, gives Sicily an exclusive competence in many matters. So all 
those policies designed to increase the competitiveness of markets, applied in 
continental Italy, run into the wall of self-government, which holds up their effects. 
The legislative delay in the rules on education, for instance, is a clear warning: Sicily 
has been the last region to pass a law promoting the access to higher levels of studies, 
and so the last one to promote the entrance of talented students into the labour market.7 
 
The partition system of legislative competences, at national and regional level, can 
easily hold up every decision. 
Add the difficulty of knowing local norms and of interpreting them with respect of the 
national ones: understanding the borders of the regional legislative competence, in fact, 
is a hard operation that demands specialized skills. The individual citizen is requested 
to face a cost for that; a cost not supported by the citizens of other regions. 
For decades Sicily has been, with all Southern Italy, the beneficiary of extraordinary 
intervention policies and a target of backwardness rhetoric. 
We wish to check that the aforementioned nature of the institutional process in Sicily 
can be one reasons of its poor economic performance. 
 
 
 
One: a short literature review. 
 
The problem that we want solve regards, in short, the system capacity of autonomies, 
and of competences’ division between national and regional governments, to be 
effective and efficient. 
That’s a question long debated from the economic analyst of rights and of public 
choice, evidencing the economic consequences and, sometimes, the economically 
preferable solutions, in a variety of vicissitudes regarding the State (for instance the 
territorial unit of government that must product and distribute public service; spillovers 
regarding goods and services, the choice between centralization and decentralization). 
                                                                                                                                               
5
 Persson T. – Tabellini G. ‘The economic effects of constitutions’, MIT Press 2003 e Buchanan J. 
‘Constitutional Economics’, IEA 1991. 
6
 AA. VV. La specialità siciliana dopo la riforma del titolo V della Costituzione, Giuseppe Verde (a cura 
di), Giapichelli editore, Torino 2003 
7
 Regional law n. 20 del 2002 
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According to a traditional economic literature various reasons to the base of the 
decentralization of some functions of government exist: in terms of economic analysis, 
in fact, it is possible, if not to define the various system of government, at least to 
support efficiency assigning functions to the central government or to other territorial 
level. 
That’s in twofold perspective: on one side in the attempt to catch up efficient regimes 
of production and allocation of public goods; from the other for the necessity to 
guarantee the mechanism of the representation and, with it, a greater sensibility of the 
governors to the preferences of citizens. 
 
Active citizens may be successful in moving public policies closer to their preferred 
outcomes because of their participation. 
In this case, citizens are said to have influence. Or active citizens may be unsuccessful, 
their political actions having no effect on policy outcomes. In this case, the citizens 
have attempted, but failed, to influence political outcomes. 
Using the economic efficiency criterion to choose the appropriate federalist structure is 
a complex endeavour involving a comparison of the economic benefits and costs of 
assigning responsibility to each level of government: to the national or central level, or 
the local government level. 
In a federal system there are two important dimensions to economic efficiency. First, 
interjurisdictional efficiency involves the appropriate allocation of individuals and other 
resources, such as capital, among the different jurisdictions. Interjurisdictional 
efficiency is achieved when the public activities of these interacting governments 
satisfy the collective demands of individuals living in different jurisdictions at a 
minimum economic cost. 
Unfortunately, decentralization has its disadvantages, due primarily to the spillovers 
that are likely to arise when jurisdiction size is small. A less decentralized system with 
larger jurisdictions can minimize the spillovers involved, while at the same time taking  
advantage of the lower cost of promulgating and enforcing certain regulations or 
dispensing the benefits of public programs, and the lower cost of obtaining and using 
information. 
 
The very great part of literature with regard to decentralization is inherent to the fiscal 
areas. 
So that, we have to start, reconstructing of the literature of our interest, from the model 
used from Tiebout in 1956.8 
His model demonstrates as the optimal amount of assets local publics can be caught up 
in those conditions of perfect mobility (that it gives place to the c.d. "voting by feet") 
for which people choose their residence based on the preferred combination between 
landing charges and assets publics. 
                                                 
8 Tiebout, (1956) ‘A pure theory of local expenditure’, in Journal of Political Economy, 416  
 5 
Therefore, in how much competition between various geographic areas supplying 
public goods and services, is possible to attend that decentralization of functions could 
produce efficiency. 
The study carried out from Tiebout - than let compete institutions based on the vertical 
division of the competences (intergovernmental) or in horizontal shape 
(interjurisdictional), in relation to joint levels that only differ for territorial area - takes 
the movements from some hard issues that literature tried to overcome. 
As typically specified, five conditions define the competitive Tiebout public economy: 
a regulated economy satisfying assumptions 1 to 5, and organized as a fully 
decentralized network of competing jurisdictions, will maximize economic efficiency. 
Citizens and businesses can consume their preferred levels of the public regulatory 
activity with a minimum expenditure of production and transactions costs. 
The following are the five conditions. 
 
1. Publicly provided goods, services, and regulatory activities are provided at 
minimum average cost. (If assumption 1 holds, there is an efficient population 
size which minimizes the average cost per household of providing that 
government activity. This rules out using Tiebout competition to allocate ‘pure 
public’ goods, those goods where additional users of the government’s facility 
does not reduce the consumption benefits enjoyed by previous users). 
2. There is a perfectly elastic supply of political jurisdictions, each capable of 
replicating all attractive economic features of its competitors. 
3. Mobility of households and businesses among jurisdictions is costless. 
4. Households and businesses are fully informed about the fiscal and regulatory 
policies of each jurisdiction. 
5. There are no interjurisdictional externalities or spillovers. (this assumption 
ensures that all public regulatory activities can be provided within these efficient 
jurisdictions). 
 
The concrete difficulties of the model leaded Frey and Eichenberger to suggest an 
alternative: respecting the freedom of choice à la Tiebout, supplies to eliminate the 
great obstacle of costless mobility. 
In such model, whose previous statements are in the theory of the clubs of J. Buchanan, 
two authors think that in common space UE it would be necessary to add to the 
freedom space for circulation of persons, goods and capitals, also the free circulation of 
the governments. 
Authors turn upside down the model described from Tiebout and, where this imagined 
perfect mobility of consumers, they postulate jurisdictions offering to the citizens the 
various goods and services leaving out of consideration the residence place. 
They place, like jurisdictional units, the so-called FOCJ (functional, overlapping, 
competing jurisdictions) – not territorial but functional – that can overlap themselves 
and, between them, compete. 
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Our perspective, however, gains better with other literature, sure more institutional, that 
opens, instead, to a systematic application of the economic conceptual apparatus to the 
legal phenomenon. 
Beside the critic of today’s normative order through an analysis supplied of classic 
microeconomic instruments, we purpose, in fact, methodological examination of the 
regional statute, encouraged in such direction from the authoritative opinion of the 
Italian lawyer Cassese S., that suggests "to mistrust from the unique methods for 
understanding the law" and "to borrow from foreign experiences of the economic 
analysis spreading its method to Italian cases".9 
 
Will, certainly, supply an important reference for our surveying, the conceptual 
apparatus from R. Cooter in The Strategic Constitution, whose criteria finds a 
continuous progress of consents, constituting the first organic treatment of economic 
analysis of public right, realized through a successful attempt of synthesis of traditional 
schools of public choice theory and law and economics.10 
 
 
 
Two: The Strategic Constitution 
 
Before concentrating on the analysis à la Cooter, it is necessary to make clear that his 
type of analysis, tied to constitutional rules for competences’ allocation, require a high 
rate flexibility and a continuous modernization of powers’ division. 
The Italian legal system, and the Sicilian statute, in particular, have not these requisites.  
In other cases, moreover, transparent and univocal trends, generally accepted, are 
absent. An instance for that is the different way to make concrete the devolution: 
competences regarding transports and communications, as an example, can be left to 
the central State, but also shared between various levels of government. 
 
At the same time, however, his analytic method concur to place a comfortable kit of 
instruments at interprets disposal, permitting to construct a coherent and not ambiguous 
evaluation system for competences’ allocation. 
The theoretical formulation, therefore, conserve a strongly valence in positive analysis: 
"the economic analysis of the public law à la Cooter (...) tries to resolve the delicate 
issue regarding the government more adapted to take care of collective interest, acting 
according to certain principles, complementary between them, usually used also in 
order to support the opportunity  of a the territorial agencies’ redefinition”.11 
 
                                                 
9 Giornale di Diritto Amministrativo 2002 n.3. 
10 Cooter R.D. (2000) ‘The Strategic Constitution’, Princeton Un. Press. 
11 Abrescia M., (2003) ‘Governare la differenziazione. L’analisi economica del diritto e il nuovo titolo V 
della Costituzione’, Mercato concorrenza regole, 1. 
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Criteria that Cooter takes from economic sciences in order to apply them to the analysis 
of institutions, will be for us the method in order to verify if beyond market’s failure 
exist government’s failures that concur to not realize optimal conditions for starting and 
exercising enterprise activity: 
 
• Transaction cost  
• Scale economies 
• Public goods 
• Spillovers 
 
Local norms increase can give place to high transaction costs that are serious obstacles 
for the citizen and enterprise’ activity. 
If a Region endowed with intensive autonomy (as Sicily) would be enough different 
from the others in the norms and institutions that transaction costs become barriers to 
the interregional exchange, contributing to slow down a, already uncertain, 
development. 
We can make the example, since now (however it’ll become clearer in the next 
paragraph) proposed by Abrescia: he noticed a deficiency in reformed directory of 117 
article Constitution.12 
Among the competence exclusive matters, in fact, do not appear norms in topic of 
vehicles circulation. 
The co-existence on the same nation of twenty (as Italian Regions) various “Code of 
Road” would render quite impossible the activity of any hauler or any citizen who 
simply would cross the borders of a Region, creating a most obvious friction. 
Besides these costs transaction we need to consider the difficulty of finding information 
on different emanated norms. 
A same case in point can, in fact, be disciplined from different norms coming from 
different authorities: the local agencies, the same Regions, the central State, European 
Union legislator, etc. 
That enormously increases the times for information and  error’s opportunities. 
 
Other criterion proposed from Cooter consists in scale economies, that are productive 
dimensions where average production costs are lowest. 
Scale economies could, in fact, assign that a good should be produced by a level 
(central or local) different from the one established by law. 
It’s understandable, therefore, as the eventual legal imposition of a productive level 
inferior than which scale economies would be, would mean to impose a legal 
diseconomy. 
Just regarding Sicily, the systematic analysis of under-dimensioned productive level is 
still in course, by Caserta et Al., moving from home market effect literature. 
 
                                                 
12 Abrescia M., op. cit.. 
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Third criterion concerns kind of service to produce. 
The competences assigned to sub-central level in supplying and financing some goods 
and services is supported with the greater information that this level has about  
preferences and needs of local population and, from other site, with the greater 
vigilance of citizen-contributors over local administrators. 
Such goods are defined from Cooter local public goods, in contrast to the classics pure 
public goods, whose production cannot be embezzled to the central level in order to 
avoid a competition, between the regions, to decrease on minimum standards. 
Production of particular goods, therefore, sometimes is more efficient if entrusted to the 
central government. 
In particular cases, quite, the centralized production is the only that can guarantee some 
goods to be produced: particular assets, characterized for not rivalry and not excludible 
(so-called pure public goods), cannot in fact be produced in market, but only by the 
central government, and traditionally we thinks that at least stabilization and 
standardizing of charges go carried to national level. 
Well, for local public goods, is just required to make sure a public supply, but a local 
autonomies supply. 
So that each sub-national unit of government can’t evade its duty to tolerate costs for  
decentralized production, it is necessary that national norms prescribe competence of  
local government cannot be removed from the same sub-national authority. 
It must be a matter not disposable for the single local communities (here is the reason 
why the division of competences must happen in Constitution, that it is a higher level 
law, intangible from the regional norms). 
 
Of course, could not be missing, in The Strategic Constitution,  a criterion regarding 
spillovers and, more in particular, with regard to those connected to production of local 
public goods. 
The production of some assets can produce effects positive or negative, not mediated 
from prices, also towards a third party. 
Where it’s happen, would need special jurisdictions, taking a task to internalise 
spillovers, imposing benefits or taxes. 
As well multiplying local competences and, therefore, increasing spillovers’ occasions, 
constitutional legislator of 2001 has not absolutely supplied to predispose any remedy. 
Therefore, above all if it comes true (as many previewed) a new expansion of speciality 
through revision of special regional statutes (v. infra par. 3), some exclusive matters 
will become concurrent matters between State and special Regions, so depriving 
economic system of whichever method of spillovers’ management and control. 
 
 
 
Three: institutional system of autonomies. 
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We will try, now, to search into Sicilian case with the instruments à la Cooter viewing 
the normative context in which its autonomy strikes root. 
It will be necessary, therefore, to premise the actual status of competences recognized 
to the local government as well as perspective of future (necessary) developments of 
the autonomy system. 
Each State offer a different model for answering positive and normative question about 
allocating power among levels of government: some of them centralize power 
subordinating regions to national government, some other reserve powers to local 
autonomies. 
Decentralized states require more governments and less hierarchy, whereas centralized 
states require fewer government and more hierarchy. 
The relative efficiency of centralized or decentralized states depends upon the relative 
efficiency of governments and hierarchies. 
 
The autonomy level of Italian Regions is established by Constitution came into force in 
1948 and by constitutional laws that approved the various special statutes. 
Italy is divided into 20 administrative regions, about 100 provinces and about 8000 
municipalities. 
The Italian Constitution provided decentralization to regions. These were distinguished 
in "Special Statute Regions" and "Ordinary Statute Regions". 
The former were established during the early years of the Republic (Sicily in 1946; 
Sardinia, Valle d'Aosta and Trentino Alto Adige in 1948; Friuli Venezia Giulia in 
1963). 
The Ordinary Statute Regions have only been implemented later (laws and decrees 
regarding decentralization of 1970, 1972, 1975 and 1977) and almost completed with 
Law Decree 112/1998. 
More recently the Constitutional Law 3/2001 has turned over the previous 
constitutional framework, which assigned only a few competences to the regional 
legislative power, and the new text lists the competences at national level, leaving the 
remaining ones to the regions. 
 
During training for the giving out Italian Constitution, two extreme attitudes to the 
continuum unity/diversity face each other: from a wall, supporters of a central 
government planner, from the other wall, supporters of an articulated system of 
autonomies. 
A conciliation was settled in the text of article n. 5 ("Republic, one and indivisible, 
recognize and promote local autonomies; (...) adapts principles and methods of its 
legislation to the needs of the self-government and the devolution") and in the system 
planned by the Title V as reformed in 2001.13 
 
                                                 
13
 constitutional law n. 3 
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We have to be conscious of how much the allotment of competence to the various 
levels of administrations is tied, sometime in inextricable way, with the typical 
institutional features of each Region, often consolidated in long time: with the character 
of State, with the existing relationships between levels of government (cooperative or 
competitive), with the kind of historical distance that has lead to asserting a system. 
The reform of Title V has been approved when the traditional moderate structure of 
devolution in our Republic was exposed to important changes by previous rules 
concerning decentralization of administrative functions. 
In a context of clear institutional hierarchy between the State, on one side, and local 
autonomies, from the other, the Constitution of 1948 assigned to the Regions the right 
to emit (for some specific matters) "norms in the limits of the main beliefs established 
from the national law, provided that the same norms are not in contrast with the 
national or other regional interest" (art. 117 old Constitution). 
Such version of Title V, therefore, used the concurrent legislation to order matters very 
significant as artisan and professional order, urban planning, tourism, viability, 
aqueducts and regional public works, handicraft, agriculture. 
The constitutional reform of 2001 has classified as exclusive State’s competence the 
power to make laws in some matters (contemplated in article 117 clause two, reformed 
Constitution). 
At the same time, article 117, third clause, describes concurrent regional competence 
(less strong than exclusive competence). 
Therefore, without differentiating between ordinary and special Regions, the reform has 
substantially packed down the speciality of the second ones: constitutional reform of 
2001, elevating the autonomy level of ordinary Regions, reduced the speciality of the 
special statute ones. 
Now, or we must think that the reason for special autonomies came over or, if it has not 
came less, the legislative autonomies of special Regions will have to find a way in 
order to reaffirm. 
"It can be supposed by means attribution to the special Regions of an exclusive 
competence in matters in which ordinary ones have only concurrent competence”.14 
The grounds where that will be able to happen are, first of all, those in third clause of 
article 116 Constitutions. 
For instance, organization of minor justice, education, ecosystem and the cultural 
assets. 
In these matters special statute Regions will be able to contract more autonomies, in 
order to reaffirm the original speciality. 
Sicilian legislator (as each other special Regions) could try, with autonomous reform of 
its stature, to realize an new local order that will concur to redesign competence 
stronger than before. 
                                                 
14
 ISAE report on federalism, 2004 
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If constituent of 2001 has granted to ordinary Regions faculties to contract greater 
powers, much greater should be the freedom that could be disposed to grant to special 
statute region. 
 
Among the matters on which could be concentrated such attempt, there’re mainly 
atmosphere protection and ecosystem. 
Recalling Cooter’s criteria, a reasonable aspiration could hide a serious danger. 
The protection of ecology, in fact, should be considered as pure public good and not as 
a local public good. 
It is notorious as norms to protect ecology are often an obstacle (a cost) for the 
enterprises whose production processes involve polluting emissions. 
If such enterprises meet the same costs on all territory will be forced, to support these 
necessary costs because of spillovers neutralization. 
If, in the same State, the protection normative against pollution depends from regional 
statutes (where,  that is, was considered like local public good), the enterprise could 
think economically more convenient to transfer the own systems (and the relative 
polluting emissions) where the region imposes smaller standards. 
 
It would establish, between Regions, a competition to the bottom in order to draw 
enterprises, lessening protection against pollution. 
That appears, as well as more realistic, for a region like Sicily, that continues to have 
the highest levels of unemployment in Italy, and that it would be probably disposed to 
barter an adequate defence of ecology with higher employment levels. 
 
 
 
Four: Sicilian case  
 
In a such system could, of course, happen that some wise central policies, find in Sicily 
a impassable obstacle in exclusive competence of the regional government. 
We have already pointed out to the regional norm on the topic of education; now we 
proceed characterizing, just as instances, a series of hypothesis where the legislative 
autonomy has determined a delay to consent to proposals already in force for the rest of 
Italy. 
 
The first experience regards Sicilian delay in have benefits of a national development 
policy. 
The decree n. 114 of March 1998 (c.d. Bersani decree) brought, in fact, a sequence of 
norms about commerce liberalization. 
This matter is classified (articles 14 point d) and e) sicilian special statute) as an 
exclusive regional competence. 
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Sicily has supplied to modernize its own law15 in December 1999: 21 months later than 
the national. 
 
Other experience concern the Unified Code on the subject of construction (in Italy 
Testo Unico), task with presidential decree n. 380/2001. 
Construction is very complex matter, disciplined by various norms, finally ordered by 
the cited decree. 
This decree has realized a strong simplification, not profited by Sicily. 
While, in fact, each Italian territorial areas have been able to reason in the terms of 
substantially homogenous discipline, Sicily, instead, has not been able to allocate that 
norm, remaining berthed to a regional law (n. 71) of 1978 and (n. 15) of 1991. 
 
Other hypothesis of inapplicability of norms has, recently, taken place in topic of  
public contracts of jobs and services. 
Also the legislative decree n. 163/2006 (code of public contracts for jobs and services), 
in fact, has met the obstacle of Sicilian autonomy. 
This issue is really too much recent (and complicated from the automatic effectiveness 
of the European detailed norms), for being faced completely. 
Remains the piece of evidence that because of the article 14 point n) of the statute, 
Sicily conserve exclusive competence in this matter and that prevents to the national 
law to extend its value inside of the regional territory. 
 
Without facing the goodness of reform that, moreover, Sicilian legislator has often 
brought to the national laws, we want just reflect: leaving out the effectiveness of both 
disciplines (national and regional), the constant Sicilian delay can easily damage local 
economy. 
The delay, in fact, constitutes a cost, not being able the Sicily to profit by economic 
advantages produced in the rest of Italy, for all the period of the lacked adjustment. 
 
To that should be overlapped the difficulty of knowing operating norms on the regional 
territory. 
That means: regional economic operator endures costs added (also in terms of chance 
renunciation), instead of the extra-regional entrepreneurs. 
Whom of them wanted to invest in Sicily would meet, at the same time, one series of 
costs connected to the not homogeneous disciplines. 
More in particular: 
 
• information costs necessary to know Sicilian norm; 
• transaction cots  in order to adapt their own production processes to the eventual 
various local institutional order. 
 
                                                 
15
 with regional law n. 28 
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If the delay (cost) depends on the exclusive competence, such delay is due essentially to 
the constitutional norm that shared the competences. 
Obviously, these costs would be, instead, compensate by benefits if the local regulation 
is more suitable (economically more productive) than the national one. 
But, Cooter standard, that is only if the classified matters to the exclusive competence 
of agree with the construction of local public goods. 
 
 
 
Five: statute valuation 
 
Before concluding, could be useful to give a little description of a recent survey carried 
out from international organizations that, with the purpose to estimate the regional 
governance, have weighed the competences assigned to local administrations and the 
structure of regional statutes, so obtaining a levels of compliance with the upper-
national institutions. 
This report has contributed to supply a chain of parameters of local statute judgment, 
moving from some issues of capability of peripheral level rules and attributions and   
confronting decisional apparatus and level of modernity. 
The issues (source UN - OCSE - UE) are assembled for areas of feature and turn out 
almost corresponding with the aim to guarantee: 
 
• transparency of decisional processes and promotion of citizens participation to 
the governance; 
• comprehensibility of norms and openness of the information; 
• clear definition of competences and responsibilities; 
• consideration of effectiveness of programmed aims and of efficiency of 
administrative management; 
• supportability of regional policies; 
• impartiality of administration and the exclusive purpose to the public interest; 
 
Of course everyone could discuss critically about such issues and their suitability to 
define quality of the devolution. 
However they seem, on a vast scale, to coincide with the criteria list from Cooter, 
representing, therefore, for a side a test for the analysis contained in The Strategic 
Constitution and, for other side, the prove for the method used up to now. 
 
Another step in the appraisal of statutes has been realized by a recent report of the 
European Agency of Investments, that has gained from the generic criteria contained in 
several international report some ponderable pointers. 
The construction of such pointers and their measurement has made to emerge 
interesting results turns out. 
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As instance, it has turned out that, among Italian regions, the statutory norms farther 
from international parameters are just those contained in special statutes. 
That means, therefore, that the special autonomy Regions have promoted a government 
system perhaps more independent, but also more distant from international standards of 
good governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grafic from Gli statuti regionali a confronto: peso e ruolo delle indicazioni UE, OCSE ed ONU sulla 
buona governance. Report Ufficio Studi AEI 21/4/2006 
 
 
Every Italian Region, anyway characterized, need to internationalises itself, 
recognizing to global organizations a role of main interlocutors, especially in a 
normative system defined, by now, of double devolution (towards European Union and 
the other international organizations or towards local autonomies).16 
The institutional order chosen by every regional legislative body, then, becomes an 
instrument in order to estimate the level of opening and attractiveness to private 
investor, Italians or foreign, public or private. 
From the board, in fact, becomes clear that three of the five special Regions (Friuli 
Venice Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige and Sicily) are placed to last the three places, and 
the other two are placed, instead, in proximity of medium values (Sardinia and Valle 
d’Aosta). 
 
The position of Sicily stands out, showing a statute very little permeated from opening 
parameters of good local governance. 
The sicilian statute, in fact, has shown to possess qualitative standards farthest from the 
average national.17 
 
                                                 
16
 See for example La doppia devoluzione: sovranazionalizzazione e federalismo interno. In  ISAE report  
regarding federalism 2004 
17
 Compliance degree 2 confronting national level 25.2. 
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